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Abstract
We study how aversion to risk and ambiguity affects the adoption of new tech-
nologies by Ghanaian smallholder aquafarmers. We conduct a set of field experiments
designed to elicit farmers’ risk and ambiguity preferences and combine it with survey-
based information on their technology adoption decisions. We find that aquafarmers
who are more risk-averse were quicker to adopt the new technologies: a fast-growing
breed of tilapia fish, extruded feed and floating cages. By contrast, ambiguity aversion
has no effect on the adoption of the new tilapia breed and extruded feed. Furthermore,
it slows down the adoption of floating cages - a technology which entails higher fixed
costs than the others - and the effect is diminishing in the number of other adopters in
the village. We argue that these differential effects are due to the fact that the technolo-
gies are risk-reducing, with potential ambiguity about their payoff distributions at the
early stages of adoption. The findings highlight the importance of distinguishing be-
tween risk and ambiguity in investigating technology adoption decisions of small-holder
farmers in developing countries.
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1 Introduction
Small-scale farmers in developing countries frequently make production decisions in a sit-
uation of uncertainty because of the prospect of weather-related shocks, crop failure, price
fluctuations, etc. In the absence of well-functioning systems of credit and insurance, they
are compelled to make choices that reduce consumption risk at the cost of future expected
profits (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Morduch 1995; Dercon and Christiaensen 2011).
The adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies is a domain where these trade-offs
can become particularly important. New technologies may be inherently more risky, require
additional investments that increase the risk exposure of farmers, or generate uncertainty
because of the imperfect knowledge of early adopters (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010; Feder,
Just and Zilberman 1985). Recent evidence supports this hypothesis. Dercon and Christi-
aensen (2011) find, for Ethiopian farmers, that consumption risk due to rainfall variability
has a negative impact on the adoption and application of fertilizers. Liu (2013) studies
Chinese farmers’ decision whether or not to adopt genetically modified Bt cotton, and finds
that more risk averse farmers adopt the technology later.
Nevertheless, the relation between uncertainty and technology adoption is not a settled
question. Uncertainty may stem not only from risk – i.e. the future state of the world is
unknown – but also ambiguity – i.e. the probabilities associated with these different states
may themselves be unknown (Klibanoff, Marinacci, Mukerji 2005). Barham et al. (2014) find
evidence that farmers in the US Midwest with a higher aversion to ambiguity adopt new GM
corn seeds sooner, suggesting that the GM crop’s insect-resistance trait reduces ambiguity.
More generally, a new technology may reduce risk or ambiguity and, thus, provide farmers
with limited access to credit and insurance a means to negotiate an uncertain environment.
In this paper, we study how aversion to risk and ambiguity affects the adoption of new
technologies by Ghanaian smallholder aquafarmers. We consider in this paper the adoption
of three distinct technologies: (i) Akosombo strain of Tilapia (AST), a fast-growing breed of
tilapia fish that offers farmers the potential to harvest twice a year compared to once only
for the existing local breed; and the use of (ii) floating cages; and (iii) extruded feed for
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the fish under cultivation. We combine data from a survey of farmers with information on
production choices and technology adoption, and field experiments with the same farmers
designed to elicit their risk and ambiguity preferences. In the experimental design, we follow
Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) and Liu (2013) so that risk aversion may be represented
both within an Expected Utility (EU) and Prospect Theory (PT) framework. To measure
ambiguity preferences, we replicate the classic experiments conducted by Ellsberg (1961)
with our sample of aquafarmers.
The experiments indicate that our sample of farmers are, on average, averse to both
risk and ambiguity. We use duration/survival models to study determinants of the speed of
adoption of the new technologies and find, contrary to most of the existing literature, that
farmers that exhibit greater risk-aversion adopt the AST, extruded feed and floating cages
sooner. We argue that this is due to the risk-reducing nature of each of these technologies.
The AST is more disease-resistant than existing local breeds of tilapia, the extruded feed
reduces the risk of water pollution and contamination associated with the conventional sink-
ing feed which can pose a threat to the health of the fish, while floating cages protect the
cultivated fish from their natural predators in the environment. We find no difference in
adoption behaviour according to our measure of ambiguity aversion with regard to AST and
extruded feed but we find that ambiguity slows down the adoption of floating cages. We
hypothesise that this is due to the significantly higher cost of this technology. However, we
also find that the speed of adoption increases strongly with the number of prior adopters
within one’s own village. Given that prior adoption of the technology within one’s locality
may reduce ambiguity about the risks and potential returns, we argue that this is suggestive
evidence of technology adoption speeding up as ambiguity declines.
Fish production and exports in developing countries are extremely important in terms of
development and growth prospects. The annual fish consumption in Ghana is about 20-25 kg
which is above the world average of 18kg and 60% of animal protein in the diets of Ghanaians
is from fish (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2012). Over the years, the government of
Ghana and other development agencies have introduced improved technologies to enhance
the productivity and profitability of the sector, but not much is known about the adoption
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of these technologies: how long it takes before farmers adopt the technologies and the factors
driving such adoption decisions. The present paper contributes by adding evidence towards
the fact that risk and ambiguity aversion can have different effects upon technology adoption
and that actually some technologies can be risk-reducing and risk aversion can speed up their
adoption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the conceptual framework and
shows that the effects of risk and ambiguity aversion on adoption can be positive or negative
depending on the specificities of the technology. Section 3 provides a description of the three
technologies considered. We describe the survey and field experiments in Section 4, and
discuss descriptive statistics and the construction of variables in Section 5. In Section 6, we
present the econometric specification. We present the results in Section 7 and and discuss
our findings in Section 8. Conclusions are provided in Section 9.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we provide a simple framework for considering how aversion to risk and
ambiguity affects a farmer’s technology adoption decisions. For this purpose, we use the
formulation of ambiguity aversion introduced by Klibanoff et al. (2005) and follow Barham
et al.(2014) in our modelling and choice of notation.
We represent a farmer’s technology adoption decision as a choice θ ∈ Θ with payoff pi (θ, e)
where e is a stochastic vector. The vector e captures factors that affect the returns to different
technologies, unknown to the farmer when making the technology adoption decision. The
distribution of e is described by the cumulative distribution function F (e|v), where v is a
parameter that may also be unknown to the farmer when making the technology adoption
decision. If v is unknown, its distribution is described by the cumulative distribution function
G (v) (the distribution being known to the farmer).
The farmer’s preferences over payoffs are given by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function U (.). If v is known, then the farmer’s welfare from choice x is defined as the
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expected utility:
W (θ|v) ≡ Ee|vU (pi (θ, e))
where Ee|v is the expectations operator using the conditional distribution F (e|v). If v is
unknown, then the farmer’s welfare from choice x is as follows:
W (θ) ≡ Evh
(
Ee|vU (pi (θ, e))
)
where h (.) is a strictly increasing function. If the function h (.) is linear, then the farmer’s
welfare is unaffected by the presence of ambiguity; but if h (.) is concave, then the farmer
achieves lower welfare when v is uncertain.
Barham et al.(2014) show that the welfare function can be written as follows:
W (θ) ≡ U (M (θ)−Rr (θ)−Ra (θ)) (1)
where M (θ) is the ex-ante mean payoff from choice θ, Rr (θ) is the standard Arrow-Pratt
risk premium, and Ra (θ) is the ‘ambiguity premium’ – the maximum the farmer is willing
to pay for the uncertainty associated with v to be replaced by Ev. From the last equation
above, it is evident that the welfare-maximising choice of θ also maximises the expression
M (θ)−Rr (θ)−Ra (θ). It follows that a higher expected return (thus, higher M (θ)) makes
a technology more attractive; increased risk (higher Rr (θ)) or increased ambiguity (higher
Ra (θ)) makes a technology less attractive; for technologies that introduce risk and ambiguity,
higher risk aversion (leading to higher Rr (θ)) or higher ambiguity aversion (leading to higher
Ra (θ)) also makes the technology less attractive.
It is possible to show the same decomposition using a Prospect Theory (PT) framework,
rather than an Expected Utility framework. For this purpose, we would replace the von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U (.) by a value-function V (.) that allows for loss-





probability weights, potentially varying with the size of the probability. In Section 6, we
indicate the specific functional forms used for U (.), V (.) and the probability weighting
function in our empirical analysis.
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The three acquaculture technologies we consider in this study – extruded feed, the AST,
and floating cages – are all, arguably, risk-reducing, as we will discuss in the next section.
On the other hand, the farmers may not have known – when they first heard about these
technologies – the values of all the parameters relevant for determining the distribution of
payoffs associated with each one (represented by v above), in which case adopting these
technologies may involve increased ambiguity.
If technology adoption involves a low fixed cost, it may be possible to experiment with
it on a small scale to determine the value of v without suffering a significant loss. If this
is the case, then the farmer’s ambiguity aversion should not be a significant determinant of
technology adoption. On the other hand, if introducing the technology involves a substantial
fixed cost, then small scale experimentation is infeasible and, therefore, ambiguity aversion
should be a more important factor. In describing the acquaculture technologies in more
detail in the next section, we show that the adoption of floating cages involved high fixed
costs while the extruded feed and the AST did not.
We can also hypothesize that the level of ambiguity associated with a particular tech-
nology is not constant over time but declines as adoption by neighbours reveals information
about the relevant parameters. In particular, if a new technology introduces ambiguity then,
ceteris paribus, it would be adopted first by farmers who have the lowest levels of ambiguity
aversion. Their experience with the technology would reveal information about the relevant
parameters, which reduces the perceived ambiguity of the technology for farmers considering
adoption at a later date, and so on.
We can summarise this discussion in terms of the following observations:
1. If a technology is risk-reducing, then risk-averse farmers will be more likely to adopt
it.
2. If a technology introduces ambiguity, then farmers who are more ambiguity-averse will
be less likely to adopt it.
3. For technologies that introduce ambiguity, ambiguity-aversion is a determinant of adop-
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tion if the technology involves a high fixed cost but not if it allows small-scale experi-
mentation.
4. If a technology introduces ambiguity, then the adoption rate should increase with the
number of prior adopters in the neighbourhood.
5. If a technology introduces ambiguity, then the adoption rate becomes less sensitive to
ambiguity-aversion as the number of prior adopters in the neighbourhood increase.
Observations 1 and 2 have previously been noted in the literature (see, for example,
Barham et al., 2014) and provide a useful way of assessing how a new technology affects
risk and ambiguity. While Observation 4 may be important in the context of ambiguity, we
acknowledge that alternative models of technology adoption would generate similar predic-
tions, such as learning spillovers (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995) and network effects (Bandiera
and Rasul 2006). However, the predictions in Observations 3 and 5 would be difficult to ac-
count for under alternative models. Hence, we argue that they provide an important test to
investigate whether ambiguity and ambiguity aversion plays a role in technology adoption.
3 Description of Technologies
In this section, we describe the three technologies for which we analyse adoption practices
among Ghanaian aquafarmers: extruded or floating feed, the Akosombo strain of Tilapia
(AST), and floating cages. Extruded or floating feed is an alternative to the conventional
feed used in aquafarming. The latter is usually prepared as a mixture of agricultural and
food industry waste (e.g. corn meal, peanut husks and wheat or rich bran) that is milled
into powder. The powder sinks to the bottom of the pond quickly making it difficult for fish
to find the feed. The feed accumulates at the bottom of the pond, where it decomposes to
set off physio-chemical reactions and increase the risk of disease outbreaks. Extruded feed is
prepared with a balance of macro- and micro-nutrients considered essential for fish growth
(Bell and Waagbo, 2008). The commercial processing of this feed removes anti-nutritional
factors, thus making it more suitable for consumption by fish (Drew et. al, 2007; Hardy,
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2010). The feed is extruded (pressed) and palletized, allowing it to float on the water surface
and remain available to fish for long periods. This helps to reduce food waste and save costs
(Engle and Valderrama, 2004) but the product is also considered to be more hygienic than
the conventional feed. Fish raised on extruded feed grow to nearly twice the size achieved
with conventional feed. However, the extruded feed is also more expensive, with a unit cost
that is nearly six times higher than that of conventional feed (Frimpong et. al, 2014).
AST is a relatively new and improved strain of tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus) developed
by the Aquaculture Research and Development Centre (ARDEC). The growth rate of the
AST is about 30-50% higher than that of the conventional tilapia in the region (Lind et.
al., 2012). AST requires just 6 months to reach the size at which it is ready for the mar-
ket, compared to 8 months for the conventional breed. As a result, farmers who cultivate
the new breed can harvest it twice a year on average as opposed to just once a year for
the conventional breed. Apart from its fast-growing properties, the AST also enjoys higher
survival rates and is more disease-resistant. Despite of this, the cost of AST fingerlings are
only about one-and-half times that of the conventional fingerlings.
Floating cages have a number of advantages over conventional rearing systems: protec-
tion of fish from potential predators, better hygienic conditions than traditional ponds and
use of already existing water bodies (Beveridge 2004). They also provide a quick way to
relocate fish in response to unfavourable weather or other environmental conditions (Pillay
and Kutty, 2005). The cage system is typically used in combination with extruded feed,
and the combination presently accounts for about 90% of Ghana’s aquaculture production
(Ainoo-Ansah, 2013; Awity, 2013). However, this technology has also significantly higher
cost than AST or extruded feed.
All three technologies – extruded feed, AST, and floating cages – are, arguably, risk-
reducing: extruded feed because it lowers the risk of disease outbreaks; AST because it
is disease-resistant; and floating cages because it allows the farmer to respond quickly to
changes in environmental conditions. If the farmer is unfamiliar with the probabilities of
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these mishaps using conventional technology, then the adoption of the new technologies also,
arguably, reduces uncertainty. However, all three technologies involve also higher costs,
which can translate into higher variability in profits, with floating cages having the highest
cost among them. Therefore, we expect a different behavior with respect to the floating
cages as compared with the other two technologies.
4 Data Sources and Experimental Procedures
The data for this study come from two sources: a survey of households engaged in aquafarm-
ing, in four regions in southern Ghana (Greater Accra, Volta, Ashanti and Western regions);
and a set of field experiments involving lottery choices with the survey respondents designed
to elicit their risk and ambiguity preferences. The survey and field experiments were con-
ducted between March and April 2014, and included 120 participants with thirty farmers
from each of the four regions. The respondents were randomly selected from a sample of 320
aquafarmers included in an earlier agricultural survey conducted by the University of Ghana.
The selected farmers were all either the owner or main decision-maker on their respective
aquafarms. The interviews and experiments were conducted on the same day, when the
selected farmers were instructed to gather in predesignated areas, such as a church, under a
tree, or an open area within the village within easy access of their homes.
4.1 Survey Data
Prior to the start of the experiments, the farmers were interviewed individually to obtain
information on their demographic and socio-economic characteristics, experience of adverse
shocks and risk management strategies, use of financial services and adoption of aquafarming
technologies. In particular, they were asked about whether they had ever used any of the
three aquafarming technologies considered in this study. Farmers were also asked to recall
the year they first heard about each technology, and the year they started using it, as well as
the reasons for doing so. The interviews lasted between 20 and 25 minutes each. Following
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Dohmen et al.(2011), the farmers were also asked to assess their own risk preferences using an
11-point scale, based on the following question: ”How do you see yourself: are you generally
a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please rank
on a scale where the value 0 means unwilling to take risks and the value 10 means willing to
take risks.” We use the farmers’ responses to construct a self-reported risk attitude (SRRA)
measure.
4.2 Experimental Design
Each experiment session involved five farmers, which took place immediately after these
farmers had concluded their interviews. The design of the field experiments for eliciting
risk preferences were modelled after Brick, Visser and Burns (2012), and Tanaka, Camerer
and Nguyen (2010) (henceforth abbreviated as BVB and TCN). Ambiguity preferences were
elicited using a version of Ellsberg’s (1961) two-colour urn experiment. Both the BVB
and TCN experiments involved giving participants a series of choices between lottery pairs,
designed to elicit their risk-related preference parameters. As advocated by Holt and Laury
(2002), real stakes were used in the experiments – discussed in more detail below – to ensure
that the participants took the choices seriously and were incentivised to reveal their true
preferences. In addition, each participant received GhC 10 (Ghanaian cedis) at the end
of the experiment as a reward for participation, which was two-and-half times the daily
minimum wage in the study areas at the time of the experiment.
In the BVB design, participants make a lottery choice from each of 10 different lottery
pairs. In each pair, lottery B involved a 50% probability of winning GhC 10, and a 50%
probability of winning nothing; while in lottery A, the participant receives GhC X with
certainty, with X varying from 10 to 1 monetary units across the different pairs. Thus, the
expected payoff is fixed at 5 in lottery B and varies between 10 and 1 in lottery A. The lottery
pairs were arranged in rows, in decreasing order according to the potential winnings in lottery
A (see Table A1). The field-workers recorded the row in which a participant switched from
lottery A to B, with only one switch permitted in choosing among the 10 pairs. Within
the expected utility framework, for each participant, the switching row provides a range
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of possible values of the risk-aversion parameter, as shown in Table A3. Participants who
switch before the fifth row would be classified as risk-loving and those who do not switch till
after the fifth row would be classified as risk-averse.
In the TCN design, participants make a lottery choice from each of 35 different lottery
pairs, arranged into three series as shown in Table A2. Series 1 and 2 involve positive win-
nings only with a maximum possible payoff of GhC 1700.1 However, the average gain in the
lotteries was much smaller, approximately GhC 6.68 (or US$3.07) which is roughly equiva-
lent to the daily minimum wage.2 Series 3 involves possible losses, but these are restricted to
be smaller than the participation fee that the farmers received for taking part in the experi-
ments. Following Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010), the winnings and probabilities were
carefully chosen to elicit three preference parameters within a Prospect Theory framework:
σ (curvature of the value function), λ (loss aversion) and α (parameter for the probability
weighting function). In stating their preferences for each lottery pair, participants were able
to indicate at most one switching row in each series. The switching rows in Series 1 & 2
together provide a range of possible values for σ and α. This is illustrated in Table A3 which
shows the switching row implied by different combinations of values for σ and α. For a given
value of σ, the switching row in Series 3 determines a range of possible values for λ as shown
in Table A3.
At the start of the session, the participants were informed that one of them (out of the
five participating in the session) would be randomly selected to play the lottery for cash.
This real incentive design was implemented in the following manner. After all the session
participants had indicated their lottery preferences, five balls were placed in a bag, numbered
according to identification numbers assigned to each farmer at the beginning of the session.
The field-worker picked a ball at random from the bag, and the farmer with the identification
number imprinted on the ball was selected for the cash lottery. Next, the farmer was asked
to pick a ball at random from another bag of 45 balls numbered one through forty-five.
Finally, the lottery corresponding to the row indicated by the ball and the participant’s
1This was equivalent to US$ 782, about half of Ghana’s average annual income per capita of US$1,605
in 2012, according to Kassam (2014).
2Farmers also got the participation fee which was about 2.5 the daily minimum wage.
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stated preference for lottery A or B in that row was implemented using a bag with 10 balls.
As mentioned above, we used a version of Ellsberg’s (1961) two-colour urn experiment
to elicit farmers’ ambiguity aversion. Participants in the experiment were presented with
two bags, each consisting of 20 balls. Participants were told the total number of balls in
each bag, and that each ball was either black and white. In the case of one bag, they were
also told the number of balls of each colour while, in the case of the other bag, they were
not informed about the colour composition of the balls. Next a lottery was described to the
participant whereby he/she would be asked to pick a colour – black or white – and receive
GhC 100 if a ball picked at random from one of the bags matched that colour. Finally, the
participant was asked how much he/she would be willing to pay to play such a lottery using
(i) the bag with the known colour composition, and (ii) the bag with the unknown colour
composition. As explained by Keller et al. (2007), the difference in willingness to pay in the
two instances provides us with a measure of the participant’s aversion to ambiguity.
5 Description of Variables and Summary Statistics
In this section, we describe the variables we construct using the survey and experimental
data to study technology adoption decisions by aquafarmers. Summary statistics for these
variables are presented in Table 1.
5.1 Technology Adoption Variables
We define time for technology adoption as the number of years from the date that a farmer
first learnt about a specific technology till the date of its first use. The earliest date that a
farmer indicated having knowledge of the availability of any of the three technologies was
1994, i.e. 20 years prior to the date of data collection. There is significant variation in
adoption rate across the three technologies: at the time of the survey, about 96% of the
farmers had adopted extruded feed, 75% had adopted the AST and only about 58% had
adopted floating cages. Among adopters, the mean time to adoption was in the range 16-17
years for all three technologies. It is notable that the average time to adoption for floating
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cages is the longest, at 17.8 years (even though this figure excludes the 42% of farmers who
were yet to adopt the technology at the time of the survey).
5.2 Measures of Risk and Ambiguity Aversion
In the BVB experiments, as shown in Table A1, switching from lottery A to lottery B in
any particular row is consistent with a range of values of r, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. To each farmer, we assign a value of r corresponding to the mid-point of the range
corresponding to his or her switching row. This procedure yields a mean value of r equal
to 2.4, implying that the average farmer is risk-loving. For the purpose of comparison, the
average self-reported risk attitude value is 5.4 (on an 11 point scale), which suggests neither
a strong aversion to risk nor a strong preference for it.3
In the case of the TCN experiments, we use Table A3 (for series 1, 2 and 3) to obtain,
for each farmer, values of the parameters σ, α and λ. We obtain mean values of 0.9, 0.7
and 1.9 respectively, implying the average farmer has a concave value function, overweighs
small probabilities and is loss averse. Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between
all possible pairs of the risk-preference parameters. We find a strong correlation between r
and σ (coefficient of 0.524). This is expected and reassuring as both parameters affect an
individual’s willingness to take risk (in the EU and PT frameworks respectively). On the
other hand, there is only a weak correlation between the self-reported risk aversion measure
and either r or σ, implying that there was little relation between how farmers assessed their
own risk preferences and how they behaved in an experimental setting. We argue that, as
the self-reported risk measure is based on a hypothetical question, it may be subject to
hypothetical bias.
We measure ambiguity aversion using the difference between a farmer’s willingness to
pay to play the risky lottery and the corresponding amount for the ambiguous lottery. On
average, farmers have a higher willingness to pay for the former compared to the latter (GhC
7.07 versus GhC 5.87), and the difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.013). Thus,
3Note that values near the middle of the scale need not correspond to risk neutrality as the farmers were
not explicitly instructed to interpret the 11 point scale in this manner.
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on average, farmers are more averse to the ambiguous gamble than the lottery with known
probabilities.
5.3 Prior Adopters in the Village
Using data on the year of adoption of the different technologies by farmer, we construct a
measure of prior adoption of the technology as follows. For each technology, village and
year, we count the number of farmers in our sample in that village who reported having used
the technology in a previous year. Given that the sample consistents of, approximately, the
same number of of aquafarmers from each village (about 30), the variable is a proxy for the
proportion of aquafarmers in a village who have adopted the technology by a given date.
For example, if in a specific year, in a specific village, the number of prior adopters is equal
to 1 (which is, roughly, the mean value of the variable in our sample), this is equivalent
to an adoption rate of 1/30 or 3.3% (given that there are roughly 30 farmers from each
village). In Figure 1, we plot the mean number of prior adopters by village, by year. We
note that the number of prior adopters in the village is consistently lower for floating cages
– the technology with the largest fixed costs – compared to AST and extruded feed.
From the perspective of any farmer, prior adoption of a technology within one’s own
village may yield information about its yield distribution that, over time, lowers or eliminates
ambiguity about the returns to the technology. Therefore, if ambiguity is a limiting factor,
the extent of prior adoption may affect an individual farmer’s own decision whether or not
to adopt.
5.4 Other Explanatory Variables
The other explanatory variables used in our analysis can be divided, broadly, into three cate-
gories as follows: demographic characteristics (age, gender, years of schooling, marital status,
household size); farm-related characteristics (farmer’s main occupation, farming experience,
property rights over farmland, farm size, contact with extension agents, access to credit,
membership of fish farmers’ association, previous experience of weather-related shocks), and
wealth indicators (home ownership, number of rooms in the house).
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The summary statistics for these variables are provided in Table 1. The demographic
characteristics all relate to the farmer who is responsible for the technology adoption decision.
The majority of farmers in our sample are male (92%), married (75%), and engaged in
aquafarming as his primary occupation (71%). On the other hand, only a minority own the
land on which they are farming (33%), and belongs to a fish farming association (32%). On
average, the farmers have completed nearly 10 years of schooling, and have been engaged in
aquafarming for more than 5 years.
In our econometric model (presented in the next section), we control for the farmer’s
age, gender, education and marital status as the existing literature shows that these factors
can influence stated or measured preferences regarding uncertainty. We use an indicator for
home ownership and the number of rooms in the house as proxies for household wealth. We
control for farm size and property rights as these factors can affect the farmer’s incentives
to invest in the farm, including the adoption of new technologies. An indicator for prior
experience of weather-related shocks is included in the model as it can affect the farmer’s
beliefs regarding the probability of future shocks and, therefore, affect technology adoption
decisions.
We also include in the model indicators for membership in a fish farming association,
and access to an extension agent, as these are potential sources for obtaining information
about new aquafarming technologies. The inclusion of these variables is motivated by a
large literature which shows that the farmer’s social network can affect technology adoption
decisions (Burton et al. 2003; Bandiera and Rasul 2006; Di Falco and Bulte 2011; Beyene
and Kassie 2015; Nazli and Smale 2016).
5.5 Representativeness of the Data
In this section, we provide a discussion of the representativeness of our sample of farmers. At
the start of the the survey, 30 farmers were randomly selected from four regions in Ghana,
from a representative sample of 320 aquafarmers included in an earlier agricultural survey
conducted by the University of Ghana. However, there was some attrition and replacement
from this original list. In the Volta Region, three of the farmers opted not to participate in
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the survey and experiment, citing religious reasons (prohibition against gambling). In the
Western Region, four farmers could not participate due to other obligations. In the Ashanti
Region, ten farmers on the original list could not be surveyed as they were participating in
a training programme conducted by the Ministry of Fisheries at the same time. In order to
maintain a sample of 120 aquafarmers, 17 additional farmers were randomly selected and
subsequently surveyed in the Greater Accra Region. This undermines the representativeness
of the final sample of aquafarmers included in the survey and experiments.
There are, however, other studies that have representative data on all registered fish
farmers in Ghana that can be compared to our sample. Onumah and Acquah (2010) report
that 91% of smallholder fish farmers are male, compared to 92% in our sample. Similarly,
Asmah (2008) and Asamoah et al. (2012) report that 95% and 88% respectively of small-
holder fish farmers in Ghana are male. In terms of formal educational attainment, Asmah
(2008) reports that the average aquafarmer in Ghana attained 10 years of formal education.
Asamoah et al. (2012) report that the average aquafarmer in Ghana has attained 9.1 years of
formal education. By comparison, in our sample, the average farmer has 9.8 years of formal
education.
No data on income or wealth was not collected during our survey and the proxy variables
(such as land ownership, plot/pond size, number of rooms in the house) are measured dif-
ferently or were not included in previous studies, thus preventing a meaningful comparison.
However, we are able to provide comparions on the basis of farm output. The average output
for our sample of farmers was 1557 kilograms of fish per annum, similar to the figure of 1518
kg/annum reported in Asmah (2008) for farms with an average size of 0.25 ha (farm type 5),
which is similar to the average pond/plot size in our sample (0.16 ha).4 These comparisons
suggest that the present sample is not be very different from other, representative, samples
of aquafarmers in Ghana.
4The total weight of fish harvested at the end of the 2012/2013 fish farming season. This included the
fish sold, consumed, and given as gift to family and friends.
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6 Econometric Specification
To investigate how the risk and ambiguity preferences of aquafarmers affect their technology
adoption decisions, we make sure of survival/duration models. In each model, the outcome of
interest is the timing of adoption of a particular technology. There is a long tradition of using
duration models to investigate determinants of unemployment spells (Kiefer 1988; Devine
and Kiefer 1991); and has also been adopted in the macroeconomics literature to study
business cycles (Diebold and Redbush 1990) and in the marketing literature to investigate
the timing of household purchases (Jain and Vilcassim 1991; Boizot, Robin and Visser 2001).
More closely related to our work is a growing literature that employs duration models to
investigate technology adoption in agriculture (Fuglie and Kascak 2001; Burton et al. 2003;
Abdulai and Huffman 2005; Liu 2013; Barham et al. 2014).
We denote by Xi(t) a vector of observable, potentially time-varying, characteristics of
farmer i at time t that are relevant for the technology adoption decision. We define the
hazard function – the probability of adopting the technology in question for the first time in
period t, conditional upon no adoption up to period t− 1 – as follows:
hi(t|X(t), β) = h0(t) exp [X
′
i(t)β] (2)
where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and h0(t) is the baseline hazard rate.
Following Liu (2013) and Barham et al. (2014), we use a Weibull baseline hazard speci-
fication: h0 (t) = pt
p−1 exp (β0). This specification allows the baseline hazard rate to be
time-dependent and nests the exponential model as a special case. The shape parameter p
determines whether the hazard rate is decreasing (p < 1), increasing (p > 1) or constant
(p = 1).
The term X′i(t)β is the empirical equivalent of the expression W (1) −W (0) where the
function W (.) is as defined in Section 2. Thus, the hazard model defined in (2) posits that
the technology adoption decision depends on the gain in expected utility or prospect value,
with larger gains being associated with higher probabilities of adoption. In our empirical
analysis, we estimate two versions of the hazard model. In the first version, we adopt the
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Expected Utility framework and assume a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with
constant relative risk aversion: U (x) = 1
r
xr. In the second version, we adopt the Prospect
Theory framework and, following Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010), assume a value
function of the form V (x) = xσ for gains x > 0 and V (x) = −λ (−x)σ for losses x < 0; and
a probability weighting function pi (ρ) = [exp {ln (1/ρ)}α]
−1
where probability ρ ∈ (0, 1]. In
these expressions, r, σ, λ and α are parameters to be estimated.
Following the reasoning provided in Section 5, we also include in vector Xi(t) farmer
i’s demographic characteristics (age, gender, years of schooling, marital status, household
size), farm-related characteristics (main occupation, farming experience, land rights, farm
size, extension contact, access to credit, membership of fish farmers’ association, previous
experience of weather shocks), and wealth indicators (home ownership, number of rooms in
the house). In each specification, we also include region fixed-effects.
We estimate the hazard model using Maximum Likelihood as follows. Using (2), the
probability density function of the time to adoption can be written as follows:




If we denote by Di a censoring dummy, taking a value of 1 if a farmer has adopted the
technology in question by the end of the period of observation and 0 otherwise, then the
likelihood contribution of a farmer who has adopted the technology at time ti can be written
as
Li = f(ti|X (ti) , β)
Di [1− F (T |X, β)]1−Di
where Fi(T |X, β) is the corresponding cumulative distribution funciton and T is the final
period observed in the data. Then the Maximum Likelihood Function is given by L (β,p) =
∏N
i=1 Li.
In estimating the hazard model for each technology, we include among the explana-
tory variables the adoption status of the other two technologies. Specifically, we include
time-varying dummy variables indicating whether the farmer had adopted the two other
technologies prior to the date in question (for a similar approach, see Butler and Moser
2010; Colombo and Mosconi 1995; Stoneman and Kwon 1994). We also include regional
17
dummies to capture region-specific characteristics not captured by the other variables, with
Greater Accra as the reference region.
Where possible, we include farmer characteristics in the model as time-varying charac-
teristics, including age and experience. We introduce education as a time-invariant charac-
teristic – equal to years of formal education at the time of the survey in 2014 – given that
most farmers would have completed their formal schooling before becoming responsible for
key farming decisions such as technology adoption.
7 Results
The estimates from our regression models on the adoption of AST, extruded feed and floating
cages are reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5 respectively. For each variable, we report hazard
ratios, with values greater (smaller) than 1 indicating that larger values of the variable in
question speeds up (slows down) adoption. For each technology, we estimate three models:
a model with the farmer’s ambiguity aversion, demographic characteristics, farm-related
characteristics and region dummies (column 1); a model where we add the farmer’s risk
aversion, based on a CRRA utility function (column 2); a model where we add the farmer’s
risk aversion based on a PT utility function (column 3).
First, we note that the farmer’s ambiguity aversion has no effect on the adoption of
AST and extruded feed (Table 1 and Table 2), but slows down adoption of floating cages.
Specifically, in the case of floating cages, we obtain a hazard ratio smaller than one (Table
5). A test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to one is rejected in all three
specifications used for floating cages at the 5% level. By contrast, for AST the corresponding
hazard ratio is larger than one across all three models and we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that it is equal to one at standard levels of statistical significance (Table 3). Similarly, for
extruded feed, the hazard ratio is larger than one (Table 4). While the estimate is statistically
significant at the 10% in column (1), it is no longer so when we introduce risk aversion into
the specification.
Second, we note that the number of prior adopters in the village has a strong, positive
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effect on the speed of adoption for all three technologies, across all three models (statistically
significant at the 1% level). The estimated coefficient of the corresponding squared term is
also significantly different from one for all three technologies, implying that the relation
between the number of prior adopters and the speed of adoption is non-linear. For AST,
the estimated coefficient is larger than one, implying a convex relationship between prior
adoption in the village and the current speed of adoption, while it is smaller than one for
extruded feed and floating cages, implying a concave relationship between the same variables.
In each specification, we interact ambiguity aversion with the number of prior adopters
in the village, to investigate whether the effect of ambiguity aversion on technology adoption
evolves as others in the village adopt the same technology. We find that the hazard ratio
for the interaction term is close to one (and statistically insignificant) in the case of AST
and extruded feed, implying that the effect of ambiguity aversion on the adoption of these
technologies does not depend on prior adoption in the village. By contrast, the hazard
ratio is larger than one and statistically significant (at the 10% level) in the case of floating
cages across all three specifications. Thus, while ambiguity averse farmers are less inclined
to adopt floating cages, this reluctance is diminished if other farmers in the village have
already adopted the technology.
For all three technologies, we find that the farmer’s risk aversion plays a significant role
in the speed of technology adoption. The hazard ratio for the CRRA parameter is shown
in column (2) in tables 3, 4 and 5. In each instance, we find that the hazard ratio is less
than one, implying that higher values of the CRRA parameter are associated with slower
adoption. As higher values of the CRRA parameter imply lower risk aversion, these estimates
imply that more risk-averse farmers adopt these technologies more quickly. In column (3),
where we replace the CRRA parameter with the PT parameters σ, α and λ, the results are
less clear-cut but broadly consistent. In particular, the estimated hazard ratio of σ – which
determines the curvature of the value function – is smaller than one, suggesting that the
farmer is less likely to adopt the technology when the value function is more concave, i.e.
when the farmer is more risk-averse. But the standard errors for the estimated coefficient are
large, such that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the hazard ratio is equal to one in the
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case of AST; in the case of extruded feed and floating cages, we can reject the corresponding
hypothesis at the 10% level. For none of the three technologies do we find any evidence that
loss aversion affects the speed of adoption (the estimated hazard ratio for λ is statistically
indistinguishable from one).
In each specification, we include time-varying binary variables indicating whether the
farmer had adopted the other two technologies by that date. The inclusion of these vari-
ables allows us to explore for the presence of complementarity and substitutability between
technologies. We find that the hazard ratios are consistently below one, suggesting substi-
tutability between technologies. However, the coefficients are imprecisely estimated, with
large standard errors such that, in most instances, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the hazard ratio is equal to one. The effect of prior adoption of extruded feed on the like-
lihood of AST adoption is the exception: the hazard ratio is close to zero and significantly
different from one (at the 1% level) across all three specifications (Table 3) implying that a
farmer who has adopted extruded feed is subsequently very unlikely to adopt AST. We also
find that the estimated hazard ratios for AST in the adoption equation for extruded feed are
below one and statistically significant (at the 10% level), implying that the adoption of AST
slows down the adoption of extruded feed (Table 4). Thus, the two the two technologies are,
arguably, substitutes.
The hazard ratios for the region dummies show significant variation in the speed of
adoption of the three aquafarming technologies in different parts of Ghana. The excluded
(reference) region is Greater Accra. For instance, the hazard ratio for the Volta Region is
significant for both the extruded feed and the floating cages: it is less than one in the former
and greater than one for the latter technology. Thus, while farmers in the Volta Region have
a higher proclivity to adopt floating cages, they are less likely to adopt the extruded feed,
than farmers in Greater Accra. These patterns may be explained by the fact that the Volta
region is characterised by a large river system and and lakes, suitable for the use of floating
cages.5 Farmers in the Western Region have a higher probability of adopting the AST, but
5The Volta River is the main river system in Ghana and the Volta Lake is one of the largest man made
reservoirs in the world.
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there is no significant difference in the adoption rates of the other two technologies between
farmers in this region and the reference region (Greater Accra).
8 Discussion
8.1 Risk Aversion and Technology Adoption
We find that, in general, risk averse farmers are more likely to adopt all three technologies
sooner. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that these technologies are risk-
reducing, as discussed in Section 3 or, at least, perceived as such by the farmers. This
finding contrasts with Liu (2013), a study which finds that risk averse farmers in China
are slower to adopt genetically modified cotton seeds. More precisely, the cotton seeds
are modified genetically with the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) bacteria, which enables cotton
plants to produce phytotoxins to kill pests. The subjective risks posed by these phytotoxins
to the farmers themselves may be an additional source of uncertainty and a likely reason for
the delayed adoption by risk averse farmers.
In the present study, the AST is also genetically modified and it is more disease-resistant
than local breeds. But it does not produce any toxins. Therefore, it is plausible that farmers
perceive it as a risk-reducing technology. In the same vein, extruded feed reduces the risk
of water pollution and contamination associated with the conventional sinking feed, which
could pose a threat to the health of the fish and the environment; and floating cages provide
an enclosure for the farmed fish, and thus reduce the threat posed by natural predators to
fish in conventional ponds.
8.2 Ambiguity Aversion and Technology Adoption
We find that ambiguity aversion has no effect on the adoption rate of AST and extruded
feed but slows down the adoption rate of floating cages (estimated coefficient is below one
and statistically significant at the 1% level). In Section 2, we argued that ambiguity aversion
would slow down adoption of a new technology if it entails large fixed efforts. If not, small
scale experimentation enable farmers to reduce ambiguity associated with new technologies.
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In Section 3, we highlighted that while the adoption of floating cages require aquafarmers to
make substantial investments, the AST and the extruded feed do not. Therefore, farmers can
learn about the AST and extruded feed, and their respective payoff distributions, through
small-scale trials but the same approach is not practical in the case of floating cages. There-
fore, the estimated effects of ambiguity aversion on the adoption of the three technologies
are consistent with the theoretical predictions.
As discussed in Section 2 the adoption of a new technology by other farmers in the
locality also provide a means of learning about a new technology and, in particular, resolve
ambiguities in the payoff distribution of the technology. Therefore, the prior adoption of a
technology by other farmers in the locality should accelerate the rate of adoption. Consistent
with this reasoning, we find that the rate of adoption of all three technologies increase with
the number of prior adopters of that technologies.
But more importantly, we find that the negative effect of ambiguity aversion on the
adoption of floating cages declines as the number of other adopters in the village increases
(interaction term statistically significant at the 10% level). This is consistent with our
theoretical reasoning that ambiguity aversion should not matter for technology adoption
if the farmer has access to sufficient information – from other adopters – to resolve the
ambiguity in the distribution of payments. For the other two technologies, the estimated
effect of ambiguity aversion on technology adoption does not vary with the number of other
adopters.
9 Conclusion
The present study examines how risk and ambiguity aversion influence the adoption of three
aquafarming technologies in rural Ghana using data from a survey of farmers and field
experiments. Two of the technologies are relatively inexpensive and contribute to a rapid
growth in fish production (extruded feed and the Akosombo strain of Tilapia) while the third
one is relatively expensive but helps protect fish from natural predators (floating cages). The
results show that, for all three technologies, risk aversion accelerates their adoption. This
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is in contrast with most of the literature which finds that risk aversion delays the adoption
of new technologies. We explain this result by arguing that all three technologies under
consideration are risk reducing.
On the other hand, we find differential effects of ambiguity aversion on the adoption of the
three technologies: ambiguity aversion among farmers slows down the adoption of floating
cages but has no effect on the rate of adoption of the two other technologies. Additionally,
we find that the presence of other adopters in the locality attenuates the negative effect of
ambuity aversion on the adoption of floating cages. Floating cages offer farmers a reduced
risk of fish mortality as they are placed in enclosed nets in the river and, thus, protected
from natural predators. Moreover, these cages can be moved relatively easily if the weather
or environmental conditions deteriorate. Therefore, they offer strong protection against a
variety of adverse shocks. On the other hand, as they are significantly more expensive than
farming in a conventional pond, they provide little scope of small-scale experimentation by
farmers. Therefore, initial adopters are faced with ambiguity in the distribution of payoffs
from floating cages, implying that ambiguity adoption would retard adoption. By contrast,
farmers can experiment with the Akosombo strain of Tilapia and extruded feed and conse-
quently learn about their payoff distributions. Based on this reasoning, we argued that, at
the early stages of the adoption process, ambiguity aversion should play a larger role in the
adoption of floating cages compared to the two other technologies.
The present article has several implications for understanding the adoption of the three
technologies under consideration and for technology adoption in general. First, the results
show that it is important to distinguish between risk and ambiguity aversion in the context
of technology adoption. Second, similar to Barham et al. (2014), our results show that
new technologies can sometimes help reduce farmers’ exposure to risk. These technologies
might provide farmers with limited access to credit and insurance a means to negotiate an
uncertain environment. Third, we provide evidence that the impact of ambiguity aversion
on technology adoption may evolve as others in the locality adopt the technology.
Therefore, providing practical information about new agricultural technologies – with
the help of extension agents and existing farmers in neighbouring villages – may mitigate
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the effects of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion on technology adoption. Furthermore, our
findings suggest that informing farmers about new technologies that lower the risk of adverse
shocks may also accelerate the adoption of new agricultural technologies.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition  Mean Standard  
Deviation 
 
   
Technology Adoption       
Time to adoption for Extruded Feed  Years between learning about technology and first use 16.62 2.28 
Time to adoption for AST  Years between learning about technology and first use  17.11 2.79 
Time to adoption of Floating cages Years between learning about technology and first use 17.76 2.53 
 
   
Risk and Ambiguity Aversion    
Risk aversion (r)  Constant Relative Risk Aversion Coefficient  2.35 2.45 
5LVNDYHUVLRQı Value Function Curvature (Prospect Theory) 0.89 0.52 
/RVVDYHUVLRQȜ Loss aversion Parameter (Prospect Theory) 1.92 2.40 
3UREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJĮ Probability weighting Parameter (Prospect Theory) 0.74 0.30 
Self-reported risk attitude (SRRA) Self-reported risk attitude on a scale from 0-10 (0 = 
unwilling to take risks, 10 = very willing to take risks)  
5.39 3.22 
Ambiguity Aversion Ambiguity Aversion measured as difference in the WTP 
between risky and ambiguous prospects  
1.20 5.86 
Farmer Characteristics       
Age of farmer at adoption of 
technology 
Age of respondent at the time of adopting technology 38.55 13.15 
Gender = 1 if farmer is male  0.92 0.28 
Education Years of formal education attained by farmer 9.83 4.62 
Marital Status = 1 if farmer is married  0.75 0.44 
Experience Number of years a farmer has engaged in fish production  5.47 5.37 
Past weather shocks = 1 if farmer experienced flooding in the past 0.73 0.44 
Main occupation = 1 if fish farming is main occupation  0.71 0.46 
 
   
Household Characteristics       
Household Size Farmer + number of people who eat from the same pot 6.08 3.03 
Own House = 1 if farmer owns his house 0.63 0.48 
Number of rooms  Number of rooms in the IDPHUV¶KRXVH 4.23 2.68 
Freehold tenure = 1 if farmer owns the farm land 0.33 0.47 
    
Access to Services        
Extension Services  = 1 if farmer has access to extension services 0.48 0.50 
Access to Credit = 1 if farmer has access to credit 0.78 0.42 
FFA = 1 if farmer is a member of a ILVKIDUPHUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQ 0.32 0.47 
 
   
Regional Variables        
Western = 1 if farmer is resident in the Western Region  0.22 0.41 
Ashanti = 1 if farmer is resident in the Ashanti Region  0.17 0.37 
Volta = 1 if farmer is resident in the Volta Region 0.23 0.41  
    
Table 2: Correlation Matrix for Risk and Ambiguity Aversion Variables 
          SRRA      CRRA (r) TCN (ı TCN (Į TCN (Ȝ 
SRRA 1.000     
CRRA (r) 0.053      1.000    
TCN (ı -0.016      0.524*** 1.000   
TCN (Į 0.020      0.102 0.285***       1.000  
TCN (Ȝ 0.010     -0.125     0.075 0.046 1.000 
*** - 1%, ** - 5%, * - 10% level of significance 
 
  
Table 3: Hazard Model Estimates for Adoption of the Akosombo Strain Tilapia (AST) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
ıYDOXHIXQFWLRQFXUYDWXUH   0.680 
   (0.192) 
ĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ 
 
  0.837 
   (0.383) 
ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ 
 
  1.042 
   (0.068) 
CRRA parameter  0.874**  
  (0.050)  
# Prior Adopters in Village  1.265*** 1.268*** 1.258*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) 
# Prior Adopters Squared 1.038** 1.038** 1.039*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
# Adopters × Ambiguity Aversion  1.004 1.004 1.005 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ambiguity Aversion  1.032 1.027 1.029 
 (0.034) (0.037) (0.034) 
Age 1.031** 1.027** 1.032** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Male 0.693 0.548 0.577 
 (0.318) (0.252) (0.283) 
Education 1.109** 1.126*** 1.123*** 
 (0.046) (0.048) (0.049) 
Married 1.696 1.902* 1.626 
 (0.589) (0.687) (0.591) 
Experience 1.147*** 1.146*** 1.141*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
Experienced Past Weather Shock 1.313 1.611 1.309 
 (0.406) (0.526) (0.414) 
Main Occupation 1.230 1.336 1.357 
 (0.404) (0.456) (0.457) 
Household Size 1.071 1.068 1.074 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.056) 
Owns house 1.050 1.152 1.138 
 (0.296) (0.330) (0.324) 
Number of Rooms 1.159** 1.163*** 1.147** 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.070) 
Farm Size  1.904* 2.166** 2.146** 
 (0.667) (0.769) (0.778) 
Freehold 1.198 1.129 1.133 
 (0.390) (0.359) (0.381) 
Extension Contact 0.800 0.711 0.591 
 (0.310) (0.281) (0.270) 
Access to Credit  3.909*** 3.485*** 3.921*** 
 (1.487) (1.359) (1.605) 
Extruded Feed 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) 
Floating Cages 0.637 0.638 0.631 
 (0.406) (0.399) (0.396) 
FFA 0.326** 0.296*** 0.358** 
 (0.156) (0.138) (0.171) 
Ashanti 1.354 1.797 1.885 
 (0.862) (1.158) (1.284) 
Western 2.228* 2.188* 2.309* 
 (0.960) (0.959) (1.022) 
Volta 0.651 0.820 0.788 
 (0.380) (0.472) (0.455) 
P 9.071*** 9.300** 9.187 
 (0.869) (0.889) (0.878) 
Observations 2,033 2,033 2,033 
The dependent variable is the number of years between learning about the technology and its first use by the farmer. Hazard ratios 
and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported in the table. All regressions assume a Weibull survival distribution. Statistical 
significance is denoted by *** (1% level) ** (5% level) * (10% level). P is the shape parameter: P<1 hazard decreases 
monotonically with time, P = 1 hazard is independent of time, P>1 hazard increases monotonically with time. 
 
Table 4: Hazard Model Estimates for Adoption of Extruded Feed 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
ıYDOXHIXQFWLRQFXUYDWXUH   0.628* 
   (0.150) 
ĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ 
 
  1.833* 
   (0.633) 
ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ 
 
  0.979 
   (0.050) 
CRRA Parameter  0.893**  
  (0.043)  
# Prior Adopters in Village  3.173*** 3.343*** 3.120*** 
 (0.599) (0.640) (0.590) 
# Prior Adopters Squared 0.846*** 0.838*** 0.849*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
# Adopters × Ambiguity 0.997 0.996 1.000 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Ambiguity Aversion  1.054* 1.045 1.053 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) 
Age 1.056*** 1.052*** 1.055*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Male 0.307*** 0.272*** 0.263*** 
 (0.089) (0.081) (0.081) 
Education 1.101*** 1.101*** 1.095*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) 
Married 0.717 0.759 0.666 
 (0.179) (0.193) (0.170) 
Experience 1.166*** 1.161*** 1.174*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Experienced Past Weather Shock 2.032** 2.322*** 1.874** 
 (0.571) (0.672) (0.535) 
Main Occupation 0.757 0.762 0.849 
 (0.180) (0.182) (0.208) 
Household Size 0.987 0.995 0.996 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.049) 
Owns house 2.117*** 2.192*** 2.014*** 
 (0.475) (0.495) (0.458) 
Number of Rooms 1.096* 1.018** 1.082 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.056) 
Farm Size  1.063 1.097 1.078 
 (0.386) (0.396) (0.405) 
Freehold 1.158 1.018 0.991 
 (0.308) (0.276) (0.273) 
Extension Contact 0.515** 0.457** 0.482* 
 (0.162) (0.145) (0.180) 
Access to Credit  2.463*** 2.268*** 2.295*** 
 (0.760) (0.696) (0.695) 
Akosombo Strain  0.454* 0.459* 0.466* 
 (0.201) (0.203) (0.209) 
Floating Cages 0.585 0.483 0.424 
 (0.354) (0.298) (0.263) 
FFA 0.475** 0.431*** 0.440** 
 (0.148) (0.132) (0.145) 
Ashanti 0.799 1.076 1.154 
 (0.396) (0.546) (0.625) 
Western 1.061 1.135 1.106 
 (0.343) (0.372) (0.375) 
Volta 0.282*** 0.362*** 0.349** 
 (0.110) (0.142) (0.144) 
P 13.329*** 13.536*** 13.428 
 (1.013) (1.024) (1.018) 
Observations 1,989 1,989 1,989 
The dependent variable is the number of years between learning about the technology and its first use by the farmer. Hazard ratios 
and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported in the table. All regressions assume a Weibull survival distribution. Statistical 
significance is denoted by *** (1% level) ** (5% level) * (10% level). P is the shape parameter: P<1 hazard decreases 
monotonically with time, P = 1 hazard is independent of time, P>1 hazard increases monotonically with time. 
Table 5: Floating Cages Technology (FCT) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
ıYDOXHIXQFWLRQFXUYDWXUH   0.520* 
   (0.195) 
ĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ 
 
  0.612 
   (0.296) 
ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ 
 
  0.988 
   (0.063) 
CRRA Parameter  0.824***  
  (0.055)  
# Prior Adopters in Village  3.136*** 3.493*** 3.153*** 
 (0.599) (0.691) (0.617) 
# Prior Adopters Squared 0.877*** 0.859*** 0.874*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
# Adopters × Ambiguity 1.019* 1.018* 1.020* 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Ambiguity Aversion  0.931** 0.929** 0.938** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) 
Age 1.002 0.991 1.004 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Male 1.989 1.181 1.428 
 (1.213) (0.706) (0.969) 
Education 1.059 1.039 1.064* 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
Married 1.362 2.054* 1.007 
 (0.545) (0.896) (0.445) 
Experience 1.119*** 1.127*** 1.115*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Experienced Past Weather Shock 1.910* 1.980* 2.299** 
 (0.688) (0.751) (0.962) 
Main Occupation 1.016 0.843 1.073 
 (0.376) (0.335) (0.419) 
Household Size 0.990 0.948 0.970 
 (0.063) (0.060) (0.066) 
Owns house 0.642 0.663 0.685 
 (0.205) (0.224) (0.235) 
Number of Rooms 1.077 1.116* 1.082 
 (0.062) (0.068) (0.068) 
Farm Size  0.521 0.459 0.518 
 (0.709) (0.677) (0.741) 
Freehold 0.796 0.623 0.857 
 (0.291) (0.232) (0.313) 
Extension Contact 0.427** 0.335*** 0.325*** 
 (0.151) (0.122) (0.130) 
Access to Credit  1.935** 1.913* 2.342** 
 (0.650) (0.666) (0.861) 
Akosombo Strain  0.335 0.195* 0.308 
 (0.263) (0.172) (0.262) 
Extruded Feed 0.651 0.673 0.667 
 (0.786) (0.825) (0.808) 
FFA 0.107*** 0.101*** 0.160*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.076) 
Ashanti 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Western 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volta 4.212*** 4.813*** 3.095** 
 (2.114) (2.561) (1.634) 
P 8.036*** 8.217*** 8.077*** 
 (0.827) (0.841) (0.835) 
Observations 2,070 2,070 2,070 
The dependent variable is the number of years between learning about the technology and its first use by the farmer. Hazard ratios 
and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported in the table. All regressions assume a Weibull survival distribution. Statistical 
significance is denoted by *** (1% level) ** (5% level) * (10% level). P is the shape parameter: P<1 hazard decreases 
monotonically with time, P = 1 hazard is independent of time, P>1 hazard increases monotonically with time. 
Appendix 
Table A1: Pairs of Lottery Choices and Expected Values in the BVB Experiments 
Row Option A Option B Expected Payoff 
Difference (A-B) 
Range of CRRA 
Parameter 
1 10/10 of 10 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 5 Infinity<r<6.579 
2 10/10 of 9 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 4 6.579<r<3.106 
3 10/10 of 8 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 3 3.106<r<1.943 
4 10/10 of 7 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 2 1.943<r<1.357 
5 10/10 of 6 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 1 1.357<r<1.000 
6 10/10 of 5 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 0 1.000<r<0.756 
7 10/10 of 4 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 -1 0. 756<r<0.576 
8 10/10 of 3 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 -2 0. 576<r<0.431 
9 10/10 of 2 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 -3 0. 431<r<0.301  
10 and no Switch 10/10 of 1 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 -4 0.301<r<infinity 
 
  
 Table A2: Pairwise Lottery Choices and Expected Values in the TCN Experiments 
SERIES 1  
Row Option A Option B Expected Payoff Difference (A-B) 
1 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 68 and 9/10 of 5 7.7 
2 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 75 and 9/10 of 5 7 
3 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 83 and 9/10 of 5 6.2 
4 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 93 and 9/10 of 5 5.2 
5 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 106 and 9/10 of 5 3.9 
6 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 125 and 9/10 of 5 2 
7 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 150 and 9/10 of 5 -0.5 
8 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 185 and 9/10 of 5 -4 
9 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 220 and 9/10 of 5 -7.5 
10 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 300 and 9/10 of 5 -15.5 
11 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 400 and 9/10 of 5 -25.5 
12 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 600 and 9/10 of 5 -45.5 
13 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 1000 and 9/10 of 5 -85.5 
14 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 1700 and 9/10 of 5 -155.5 
 
SERIES 2  
15 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 54 and 3/10 of 5 -0.3 
16 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 56 and 3/10 of 5 -1.7 
17 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 58 and 3/10 of 5 -3.1 
18 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 60 and 3/10 of 5 -4.5 
19 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 62 and 3/10 of 5 -5.9 
20 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 65 and 3/10 of 5 -8 
21 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 68 and 3/10 of 5 -10.1 
22 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 72 and 3/10 of 5 -12.9 
23 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 77 and 3/10 of 5 -16.4 
24 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 83 and 3/10 of 5 -20.6 
25 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 90 and 3/10 of 5 -25.5 
26 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 100 and 3/10 of 5 -32.5 
27 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 110 and 3/10 of 5 -39.5 
28 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 130 and 3/10 of 5 -53.5 
 
SERIES 3 
29 5/10 of 25 and 5/10 of -4 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -21 6 
30 5/10 of 4  and  5/10 of -4 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -21 -4.5 
31 5/10 of 1  and  5/10 of -4 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -21 -6 
32 5/10 of 1  and  5/10 of -4 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -16 -8.5 
33 5/10 of 1  and  5/10 of -8 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -16 -10.5 
34 5/10 of 1  and  5/10 of -8 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -14 -11.5 
35 5/10 of 1  and  5/10 of -8 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -11 -13 
 
  
Table A3: Switching Point from Option A to Option B and ASSUR[LPDWLRQVRIıĮDQGȜ 
$SSUR[LPDWLRQVRIı from Series 1 and 2 from TCN Lottery Pairs  















ı 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 NS 
1 1.50 1.40 1.35 1.25 1.15 1.10 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.50 
2 1.40 1.30 1.25 1.15 1.10 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.60 0.55 0.50 
3 1.30 1.20 1.15 1.10 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.55 0.50 0.45 
4 1.20 1.15 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.50 0.45 0.40 
5 1.15 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.40 0.35 
6 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 
7 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 
8 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 
9 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 
10 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.20 
11 0.80 0.75 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.15 
12 0.75 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.10 
13 0.65 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.10 
14 0.60 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.05 
  NS 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
$SSUR[LPDWLRQVRIĮIURP6HULHVDQGIURPTCN Lottery Pairs  















Į 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 NS 
1 0.60 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30 1.40 1.45 
2 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.35 1.40 
3 0.55 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30 
4 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 
5 0.45 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 
6 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 
7 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 
8 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 
9 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 
10 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 
11 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 
12 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 
13 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 
14 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 
  NS 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.60 
Approximations of O from Approximated VDOXHVRIı 
Row ı  0.10 0.20 0.25 0.35 0.40 
1 LQILQLW\Ȝ LQILQLW\Ȝ LQILQLW\Ȝ LQILQLW\Ȝ LQILQLW\Ȝ LQILQLW\Ȝ 
2 Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 
3 Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 
4 Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 
5 Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 
6 Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 
7 Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 5.11Ȝ Ȝ 
NS ȜLQILQLW\ ȜLQILQLW\ ȜLQILQLW\ ȜLQILQLW\ ȜLQILQLW\ ȜLQILQLW\ 
 
Figure 1: Prior Adopters for extruded feed (EFT), Akosombo strain of Tilapia (AST) and
floating cages (FCT)
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